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There are always theoretical assumptions involved in research. Theoretical assumptions determine 
which phenomena are visible and which are invisible and they make different educational goals and 
pedagogical strategies either thinkable or unthinkable. This collection of articles expands the dialogue about 
educational research by exploring a range of different ways of conceptually framing education. Each 
different conceptualisation reveals a different set of objects and relationships and so opens up different ways 
of thinking about educational goals.  For example, Tsafrir Goldberg and Baruch Schwarz bring emotion into 
the frame in a study which suggests that conventional approaches to education that ignore emotion do so at a 
cost. Goldberg and Schwarz suggest, with evidence, that by engaging with emotion explicitly we can 
improve the quality of argumentation and so have a cognitive learning gain. This example illustrates the 
value of seeing education through a new conceptual frame. Implicit in their account is the potential to 
understand educational goals in a new way, switching from thinking of education in terms of cognitive 
development to thinking of it in terms of emotional development. A similar account can be given of each of 
the articles in this special issue. Each claims to enrich our understanding by foregrounding a different aspect 
of the complex whole of education thereby enabling us to think in new ways about the nature of education 
and the goals of education. 
Implicit in this first paragraph, and in the introduction to this special issue, is the assumption that 
expanding the dialogue about education with a range of new conceptualisations is a good thing. But there is 
an obvious possible challenge to that assumption. Surely the goal of scientific research should not be to 
proliferate a range of perspectives but to tell us which one is true, or at least more true than the others? This 
special issue offers us the choice to look at education through the framework of patterns of space and time 
(Giuseppe Ritella, Beatrice Ligorio and Kai Hakkarainen), social practices (William Penuel, Daniela 
DiGiacomo, Katie Van Horne and Ben Kirshner), ecology (Crina Damsa and Alfredo Jornet) imagination 
(Jaakko Hilppö, Antti Rajala, Tania Zittoun, Kristiina Kumpulainen and Lasse Lipponen) as well as the 
already mentioned focus on emotion (Tsafrir Goldberg and Baruch Schwarz). But in this proliferation of 
possible perspectives the question must arise which one or which ones should we choose to focus upon and 
on what basis can we make that choice?  
In order to distinguish science from what he called ‘pseudo science’, Karl Popper used the example 
of astrology (Popper, 1963). Astrology offers a complex language for describing reality in terms of forces 
that are said to underlie and control both emotions and events. I do not think that astrology could have 
survived so long or be so popular if it did not serve some kind of function and that function seems to be 
helping people feel as if they understand their lives. The example of astrology teaches us that we need to 
distinguish between the comforting illusion of mastery provided by any analytic framework whatsoever and 
a more scientific understanding that actually works because it is not simply a social construction but based 
on correspondence with some sort of underlying reality or transcendental context.   
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The social anthropologist Marshall Sahlins pointed out the danger of ontology recapitulating 
methodology in social science research (1976, p. 89). He made this quip as a criticism of ecological analysis. 
His point was that first we see everything in terms of interacting organisms and then, after a long complex 
study, we conclude that everything seems to be interacting organisms. The same could apply to chronotopic 
analysis. First we assume that everything is patterns of space and time and then we conclude our study by 
pointing out ‘so you see everything turns out to be patterns of space and time’. The point is not, can we look 
at things this way, but what do we gain if we look at things this way? Given that there are always an infinite 
number of possible ways of looking at things why should we invest in this one? 
Part of the claim made as to the value of chronotopic analysis is as a contrast to assuming the 
hegemony of a single ‘objective’ or ‘physical’ frame of space and time. This is perhaps just a way of 
acknowledging that different perspectives can be different worlds, not simply points of view within an 
already given world. This is clear in the example that Ritella et al give of an education project with 
aboriginal Canadians where local space-time conflicted creatively with scientific space-time.   
For Bakhtin, the originator of the concept of chronotope, dialogues were not so much dialogues 
between people as dialogues between chronotopes. If dialogues are dialogues between chronotopes then 
there must be a chronotope of chronotopes. Bakthin called this ‘Great time’: basically the idea of the dialogic 
space within which different cultures can learn from each other across apparent external distances in space 
and time. Great time is precisely not the idea of an encompassing context that is monologic, like the idea of 
an objective overarching context of space and time. But how can we think this dialogic meta-context? 
Perhaps we cannot think it but we can feel it. In a typically gnomic sentence in his late notes Bakhtin refers 
indirectly to his concept of great time when he writes: ‘the unspoken truth in Dostoevsky (Christ’s kiss). The 
problem of silence.’ (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 148). This refers us to a story within a story. In Doestoevsky’s the 
Brothers Karamazov Ivan tells the tale of how Christ, having returned to earth in Seville at the time of the 
counter-reformation, has been arrested by the Spanish inquisition. The Grand Inquisitor visits his cell and 
explains his crime. Apparently Christ’s mission of freeing humanity was cruel since most humans could not 
cope with such freedom. Instead they needed the meta-narrative provided by the church. Christ listened in 
silence to his condemnation and responded only with a single kiss. In this image of Christ’s silent kiss we 
have a radically different way of thinking about education. It suggests a goal beyond the merely cognitive. 
The ability to understand others’ perspectives without becoming lost in them. An understanding that is not 
verbally articulated but takes the form of love. I suspect that this is a goal for education that follows logically 
from adopting a chronotopic frame of analysis but I wonder what the authors of the paper think about that. 
Perhaps we need a proliferation of different conceptualisations because we find ourselves within 
education and we cannot have an overview. There is no single master voice or ruling chronotope that we can 
rely upon. But this does not mean that anything goes and we should treat astrology as if it was science. 
Goldberg and Schwarz again show a way forward. Not content simply with conceptualising education 
differently they turn their conceptualisation into an experimental study that tests its value.  Their comparison 
of three methods of education suggest, as a working hypothesis at least, that some ways of educating lead to 
a more fruitful combination of emotion and cognition than other ways of educating. In my view this is the 
sort of study that all these different conceptualisation could do and ought to do in order to demonstrate their 
fruitfulness. It is not enough to say, look this is interesting and seems to make sense – astrologers could say 
the same. Implicit in putting forward a way of conceptualising education is the claim that this is fruitful for 
education and if so I think this needs to be explored and demonstrated further with empirical research.  
Popper used the example of astrology as a pseudo-science in order to make a contrast with real 
science. Pseudo-sciences like astrology, psychoanalysis, Marxism and so on were so vague in their claims 
that they could not be falsified by any evidence. It is hard to see how conceptualising education in terms of 
space and time or ecology or imagination or social practice could ever be directly falsified. However this 
does not mean that such conceptualisations are not part of the larger dialogue of educational science. Lakatos 
argued, against Popper, that the different ways of conceptualising things represented by different scientific 
‘programmes’ did in fact compete and evolve even though they could not be falsified directly. The authors of 
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the different ways of conceptualising education in these studies are all claiming that their way of thinking is 
fruitful for education. Once we acknowledge in all humility that we do not know the truth and can never 
know it completely then it becomes plausible that a range of different ways of approaching the true might be 
useful and might in fact, in their own different ways, all be partly true or partly good even while remaining, 
from our limited point of view, apparently incompatible with each other. In other words the proliferation of 
many conceptualisations of learning reflects what Bakhtin might call a polyphonic truth where the truth is 
not to be looked for in any one voice but in the ongoing dialogue. 
Normally design-based research seems to assume a given world and just manipulate a few variables 
within that world. But there is no reason why we cannot extend the design-based research approach to 
include dialogue between conceptualisations of education. Ultimately we will only know if these different 
ways of conceptualising education are useful or not if they lead to fruitful consequences. And how do we 
judge if a consequence is fruitful you ask? I can see why you want clear criteria but that is not how it works. 
The truth of education is not ultimately a question of theory but a question to be answered by life and by how 
we live together and construct our future lives together. 
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